Commentary on Sections Limitation Section 32: Limitation of actions
141.Section 32 provides for three things: (1) it brings forward the date on which a right of action accrues in relation to defamation and conduct falling within Part 2 for a malicious publication; (2) it reduces the period, starting from the accrual of the right of action, within which an action must be brought; and (3) it restricts the limitation period applying to subsequent publications of the same or substantially the same material by the same publisher, so that any right of action based on such publications attracts the same limitation period as the first publication. Instead of multiple different limitation periods, there is, in cases involving subsequent publication, a single limitation period, running from the date on which the statement complained of was first published to the public or a section of the public. This means that it will have been made available to the public in general, or at least a cross-section of the public, and without restriction according to membership of, for example, a particular club, profession or similar. It is only within the one-year period that any action based on subsequent publication of the same or substantially the same material can be brought.
142.Subsection (1) sets out the operation of the provision. It amends section 18A of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 (“the 1973 Act”).
143.Subsection (2) provides for reduction of the limitation period for the bringing of defamation actions and actions under Part 2 from 3 years to 1 year. The result is that any action for defamation must be brought within 1 year of the date on which the right to bring an action accrues.
144.Subsection (3) inserts new subsections (1A) – (1C) into section 18A of the 1973 Act. Inserted subsection (1A) imposes a restriction, in certain circumstances, on the bringing of actions in respect of subsequent publication of material that has been published previously. It is intended to address a potential risk of perpetual liability for defamation, owing in particular to the increasing prevalence of online publication. As matters currently stand, each accessing of an article, image etc. by a new reader/viewer/listener would trigger a new cause of action and, therefore, a new limitation period. The effect of subsection (1A) is that, where material has been published to the public or a section of the public, any right of action based on subsequent publications of the same (or substantially the same) material by the same publisher is taken to have accrued on the date on which the statement was first seen or heard and understood by the public or a section of the public. The member of the public on whom the start of the limitation period is based must be a person other than the subject of the statement – in other words, a third party.
145.As a result, there will, in general, be a single limitation period of 1 year, during which any actions in respect of the subsequent publication can competently be brought. The court will, though, retain its discretion, in terms of section 19A of the 1973 Act, to allow an action to be brought notwithstanding that it would ordinarily be excluded by limitation in terms of section 18A. This exercise of discretion could extend to disregarding the 1 year limitation period which will ordinarily be applicable to subsequent publication of a statement which is the same or substantially the same as that published previously.
146.Inserted subsection (1B) makes clear that the restriction outlined above does not apply if the court determines that the manner of the subsequent publication is materially different to that of the original publication.
147.Inserted subsection (1C) provides guidance as to how the question of whether there is a material difference in publication should be determined. Two specific factors are identified which may be taken into account, as appropriate: the level of prominence of the statement the subsequent publication of which is complained of, and the extent of the subsequent publication. These matters are to be judged relative to the prominence and extent of publication when first published to the public. So, for example, the court may look at whether it has been transferred from a relatively obscure position on a website to somewhere more obvious and easier to access. This may speak of a material difference in the level of both publication and prominence. Beyond this, the court may take account of any other circumstances it considers relevant to the particular case.
148.Subsection (5) provides for the insertion of new subsections (3A) and (3B) into section 18A of the 1973 Act. Inserted subsection (3A) makes clear that the alteration to the dates on which rights of action accrue has no effect in relation to a statement published before the coming into force of this section of the Act. Inserted subsection (3B) provides refinement as to how the application, or otherwise, of subsection (3A) is to be determined.
149.Subsection (6) provides for consequential amendments to section 18A(4) of the 1973 Act. Most substantively, it alters the date on which the right of action accrues in relation to defamation actions and actions under Part 2. In terms of the amendment made by subsection (6)(b)(iv), this will happen when the statement is published for the first time. Reading this provision together with section 32(3), the effect will be that the accrual from first publication will apply in all cases, regardless of whether the statement is communicated to the public at large or to one individual, or any level of communication in between. It will be necessary only that the statement should be seen or heard by at least one person who understands its substance.