Annex 1: Minor changes in the law made by the Act: Change 148: Definition of “caravan” given by section 875 relevant to sections 20, 266, 308, 787 and 809
This change provides a single definition of “caravan” relevant to a number of sections and based on section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and section 13(1) of the Caravan Sites Act 1968.
The change is relevant to sections 20, 266, 308, 787 and 809.
For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Schedule A (see section 15(1) of ICTA) “caravan” has the meaning given by section 29(1) of the 1960 Act. Paragraph 3 is re-written in section 266. The same definition is attracted by paragraph 4 of Schedule A (re-written in section 308).
Subsection (1) of section 875 reproduces the effect of section 29(1) of the 1960 Act; and subsection (2) reproduces the effect of section 13(1) of the 1968 Act. The section does not, however, reproduce the effect of section 13(2) of the 1968 Act (which provides that a structure mentioned in section 13(1) (a twin-unit caravan) is not a caravan if its dimensions exceed specified limits). Neither the 1960 Act nor the 1968 Act extend to Northern Ireland. However, the Caravans Act (Northern Ireland) 1963 contains the same definition for Northern Ireland as is contained in section 29(1) of the 1960 Act.
It is not clear whether the 1968 Act modifications apply for the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule A. First, it is likely that Parliament intended that only one definition of “caravan” was to apply throughout the United Kingdom. But the 1968 Act does not extend to Northern Ireland. As the substance of the definitions in the 1960 Act (which applies to Great Britain) and in the Northern Ireland Act of 1963 are the same, a reference to the definition in the 1960 Act would be enough to secure a uniform definition.
Second, paragraph 3(2) of Schedule A provides that “caravan” has the meaning “given by” section 29(1) of the 1960 Act. Section 13 of the 1968 Act modifies the operation of Part 1 of the 1960 Act (rather than the section 29(1) definition). Because the definitions in section 29(1) apply “in” Part 1 of the 1960 Act it is therefore not certain whether the modifications made by the 1968 Act have been attracted.
Section 875 resolves these doubts by reproducing only section 13(1) of the 1968 Act. Consequently it does not matter whether a twin-unit caravan can be lawfully moved on a highway when assembled. For the purposes of Schedule A (as re-written in this Act) it is also immaterial if the twin-unit caravan exceeds the dimensions specified in section 13(2) of the 1968 Act. Schedule A treatment seems more appropriate the bigger the structure.
The definition of “caravan” in section 875 is also relevant to sections 787 and 809. “Caravan” is not defined in the definition of “residence” in paragraph 7 of Schedule 10 to F(No 2)A 1992 (rent-a-room relief) or in paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 36 to FA 2003 (foster-care relief). Accordingly, “caravan” has its ordinary meaning in those provisions. The definition of “caravan” in section 875 is wider than the ordinary meaning: for example, it includes structures that can be moved only by being put on trailers.
In relation to section 787 (which re-writes paragraph 7 of Schedule 10 to F(No 2)A 1992), a structure covered by the extended definition of “caravan” may be covered by the reference to a building or part of a building. But if not, the effect of moving from the ordinary meaning of “caravan” to the definition in section 875 is to widen the range of residences in relation to which rent-a-room relief is available.
In relation to section 809 (which re-writes paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 36 to FA 2003) the definition of “residence” used in section 787 applies. Consequently, the point made in relation to section 787 is also relevant. In referring to “the” residence, paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 36 to FA 2003 assumes that the accommodation which is actually provided by the foster carer for the child is caught. That would include accommodation comprising a structure covered by the extended definition of “caravan”. Therefore the application of the extended meaning of “caravan” has no effect in relation to foster-care relief.
The changes are in taxpayers’ favour in principle and may benefit some in practice. But the numbers affected and the amounts involved are likely to be small.