Part 1: Espionage, sabotage and persons acting for foreign powers Foreign interference Section 17: Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service
Section 17 creates two offences related to obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service.
	Subsection (1) makes provision for an offence where a person either obtains, accepts or retains a material benefit (other than an excluded benefit – see subsection (4)) for themselves, or obtains or accepts the provision of such a benefit to another person. In both cases The benefit must be or have been provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and the person must know or, having regard to other matters known to them, ought reasonably to know that. This offence could include circumstances where a person obtains a benefit directly from a foreign intelligence service, such as a gift of payment, or where a person accepts a benefit on someone’s behalf.).
	Subsection (2) makes provision for an offence where a person either agrees to accept a material benefit (other than an excluded benefit – see subsection (4)), or agrees to accept the provision of such a benefit to another person. This is different to the offence in subsection (1) because the benefit has not yet been obtained, accepted, or retained. As with the offence in subsection (1), the benefit must be a benefit that is to be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and the person must know or, having regard to other matters known to them, ought reasonably to know that this is the case. This offence would include instances where a person has agreed to cooperate with a foreign intelligence service in reliance on a promise to receive some future benefit.
	Subsection (3) provides a non-exhaustive list of what constitutes a material benefit. A material benefit may include financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information. A financial benefit may be money or a gift with a monetary value. This could include, but is not limited to, a beneficial contract or a direct cash payment.
	Subsection (4) sets out when a material benefit is an excluded benefit. A material benefit is an excluded benefit if it is provided as reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services, and the provision of those goods or services does not constitute an offence.
	Subsection (5) states that a benefit may be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service directly or indirectly, such as through one or more companies.
	Subsection (6) makes clear when conduct outside the UK will be relevant. Both subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but only apply to conduct wholly outside of the United Kingdom where:
the material benefit is or was, or is to be, provided in or from the United Kingdom;
in any case, the person engaging in the conduct is a UK person (defined in section 2) or acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).
	Subsection (7) to (9) set out a number of defences.
	For the offence of retaining a material benefit in subsection (1), subsection (7) states that it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for retaining the benefit.
	In respect of the offences in both subsection (1) and (2), subsection (8) provides that it is a defence for a person to show that they engaged in the conduct in question in any of the circumstances set out at subsection (8)(a) – (c)
	These circumstances are: conduct in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom, excluding obligations under private law (subsection (8)(a)); in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, conduct for the purposes of those functions (subsection (8)(b); or conduct that is in accordance with, or in relation to, UK-related activities carried out in accordance with an agreement or arrangement. The agreement or arrangement must be one to which either the United Kingdom was a party, or any person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party (subsection (8)(c)).
	Subsection (9) provides that the burden of proof in relation to the defences in subsections (7) and (8) is an evidential one.
	Subsection (10) sets out the maximum penalty available for the offence in subsection (1), which is 14 years or a fine, or both.
	Subsection (11) sets out the maximum penalty available for the offence in subsection (2), which is 10 years or a fine, or both.
	Subsection (12) is a list of terms which all have the same meaning as those in section 3 of this Act.
Example 1 (obtaining a benefit for yourself)
Person A is a UK-based individual who works as an estate agent in a part of the UK with a significant military presence. A is approached by an officer of a foreign intelligence service, Person B, who declares their line of work to A, and asks A to supply details of his clients. These clients are likely to include personnel whose roles are sensitive. In return, B pays for A to send his children to a private school that he could not otherwise afford. These payments are evidenced; however, the information about the supply of A’s clients’ contact details to B cannot be recovered evidentially.
Example 2 (accepting the provision of a benefit for another)
Person C works for weapons manufacturer with sensitive public sector contracts. C meets someone he knows is an officer of a foreign intelligence service at a charity function, and the officer gives him a cheque in favour of C’s charity, saying there could be more to come if C agrees to assist them in ways that will be explained at a future date; C says OK and banks the cheque. C hasn’t yet committed an offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service in section 3, or himself obtained a material benefit, or agreed to accept anything for himself. However, by taking and banking the cheque, he has accepted the provision of a benefit to his charity
Example 3 (agreeing to accept a benefit for yourself)
Person D is a contact of a UK scientist working in the nuclear sector. D is approached by a person who identifies himself as a foreign intelligence officer and who offers D a reward if D will introduce him to the scientist. D agrees to arrange the meeting in anticipation of receiving a substantial sum of money in return, with the payment to be made after the meeting has taken place.