3.The purpose of the Act is to put in place the legal powers and duties needed to enable the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations under the new Additional Protocol referred to in paragraph 9 below, concerned with nuclear non-proliferation. It does this by overriding legal restrictions which would otherwise prevent or inhibit the disclosure to the Secretary of State of information which the UK will have to give to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); by enabling the Secretary of State to require people to give him such information; by giving officers authorised by the Secretary of State a right to enter premises to obtain information which has been required but not given; and by giving inspectors from the IAEA rights of access to locations in the UK which the inspectors are entitled to visit under the new Additional Protocol.
4.It is expected that the information and access for IAEA inspectors will be provided voluntarily by those from whom it is sought. However, to ensure that the UK can comply with its international obligations even where someone does not co-operate, the Act makes it a criminal offence not to give such information to the Secretary of State when required, or to obstruct officers authorised by the Secretary of State or IAEA inspectors in exercising the rights given to them by the Act.
5.The Act also contains provisions, among other related matters:
	to deal with false statements;
	to ensure that officials only use information obtained under the Act or new Additional Protocol for relevant purposes; with certain limited exceptions it will be an offence otherwise to disclose any information; and
	to allow, if necessary, extension of the Act by Order in Council to cover the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and the dependent territories.
6.The IAEA operates a system of nuclear safeguards designed to ensure that nuclear materials in civil use are not diverted for use in non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) to develop clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. This system has traditionally focused on nuclear materials accountancy and control and is implemented in States which have concluded legally binding "safeguards agreements" with the IAEA in accordance with their international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Although not required to do so by the 1968 Treaty, the UK - like the other nuclear weapon States - has concluded a voluntary Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
7.After the Gulf War, it was found that Iraq had been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme despite having in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA designed to cover all source and special fissionable material in Iraq. North Korea was later found also to have been developing such a programme. These discoveries drew attention to the fact that the effectiveness of the international nuclear safeguards regime was, to a large extent, dependent upon States acting in good faith in declaring their holdings of nuclear material and related activities.
8.The IAEA has subsequently developed an improved system of safeguards aimed at strengthening its ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in NNWS. The basic idea is that the provision of additional information to the IAEA and greater access for IAEA inspectors will enable the IAEA to build up a more complete picture of a State's nuclear-related activities, thereby enabling it to look for inconsistencies or anomalies which could be indicative of clandestine activities. A key feature of the new system is that, for the first time, it gives the IAEA access to information on nuclear fuel cycle-related activities (for example, manufacture of specialised equipment, and research and development) even where nuclear material is not involved. Some features of the improved system require new legal authority beyond that in existing safeguards agreements, so the IAEA has been negotiating with member States new protocols additional to these agreements, providing for the new features. These "additional protocols" are based on a Model Protocol (IAEA document INFCIRC/540) agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.
9.The Additional Protocol to the UK's Safeguards Agreement takes account of the United Kingdom's status as a Nuclear Weapon State and, like the additional protocols applicable to other Member States of the European Union, has three Parties: the European Atomic Energy Community as well as the UK and the IAEA. It was agreed by the Council of Ministers on 8 June 1998 and approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 11 June. The Additional Protocol was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. The text of the Additional Protocol was presented to Parliament in March 1999 in a Command Paper (Cm 4282).
Summary and Background