Schedules Schedule 2: Sentencing Consolidation: Pre-Consolidation Amendments Committals
Schedule 2 makes a number of amendments in order to ensure consistency in relation to sentencing powers on committal from the magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court for sentence. There are principally three types of amendments to powers of committal that are of note.
	The first series of amendments relates to the particular wording of the powers to sentence an offender after they have been committed for sentence. Under sections 4, 4A, 5, 5A and 7 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 the court’s powers on committal are those they would have if the offender had "just been convicted of the offence on indictment" (or in the case of section 7 the powers the magistrates’ court would have if it had "just convicted him of the offence").
	The effect of this provision appears to be to deem the offender to have been convicted on the day of sentencing, rather than the day they were actually convicted. In R v Robson [2006] EWCA Crim 1414, [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 54, the Court of Appeal was required to consider whether this meant that where an offender had crossed a relevant age threshold between his original conviction and his sentencing on committal this meant he should be sentenced by reference to his current age rather than his age at conviction. The court held it did not. The word "just" in these powers is potentially misleading and has therefore been omitted in the relevant places by paragraphs 8(2), 9(3), 10, 11 and 13.
	The second series of amendments relates to section 6 of the 2000 Act which provides that where a magistrates’ court has committed an offender to be sentenced in the Crown Court, they may also commit to the Crown Court additional offences to be dealt with at the same time. The intent of this provision is to allow all relevant matters to be dealt with at once by the same court. This is not only administratively easier, but also helps to ensure that the resulting sentence is consistent with the principles of totality, and that the discretion of the Crown Court is not fettered by a sentence imposed by the magistrates’ court.
	Section 6 of the 2000 Act applies only where an offender is committed under a power listed in subsection (4) of that section. At present there are a few notable omissions from that section, namely the powers to commit an offender for sentence under section 6(6) or 9(3) of the Bail Act 1976 (committal for offences of absconding by person released on bail or agreeing to indemnify sureties in criminal proceedings, respectively), section 43 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (power of magistrates’ courts to commit for restriction order) and paragraph 22(1) of Schedule 8 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (committal for commission of a further offence while community order is in force). These omissions cause practical problems. In R v De Brito [2013] EWCA Crim 1134, [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 38, having committed an offender under paragraph 22(1) of Schedule 8 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to the Crown Court, the magistrates’ court also purported to commit him to that court for the further offence under section 6 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. They did not, however, have that power and therefore the sentence ultimately imposed by the Crown Court was unlawful. Paragraph 12 therefore amends section 6(4) of the 2000 Act to ensure that it applies where offences are committed under those provisions.
	The third notable amendment relating to committal powers is that made to section 147 of the 2000 Act by paragraph 48.
	Section 147 provides the Crown Court with the power to disqualify an offender from driving where they used a motor vehicle for the purposes of their offence. The power is available where the Crown Court convicts the offender of certain offences, or where the offender is convicted of such an offence by the magistrates’ court and committed for sentence to the Crown Court under section 3 of the 2000 Act.
	Paragraph 48 omits subsection (1)(b) of section 147 so that a driving disqualification can be imposed where the offender is committed for sentence under any power that gives the Crown Court the power to deal with the offender as if they had been convicted on indictment. This change does not impact on a maximum penalty and in all cases the order would have been available if the offender had been committed under a different provision.