Part 1: Digital Markets Chapter 4: Pro-Competition Interventions Section 46: Power to make pro-competition interventions
This section sets out the CMA’s power to remedy competition problems it finds in relation to relevant digital activities undertaken by designated undertakings by making "pro-competition interventions" (PCIs), and its power when doing so to address any associated consumer detriment.
	Subsection (1) empowers the CMA to implement a PCI where it considers doing so would be proportionate to remedy, help remedy or mitigate an adverse effect on competition.
	Subsection (2) provides that when deciding what, if any, action to take to address the factor or combination of factors having an adverse effect on competition, the CMA may consider any benefits to UK users and UK customers arising from those factors. The PCI provisions adopt the terms UK users and UK customer, the former term being defined in this Act and the latter using the customer definition set out in the Enterprise Act 2002.
	Example (1): A consumer benefit in a PCI investigation
The CMA may conduct a PCI investigation into a suspected competition concern related to a designated undertaking’s designated operating system (OS) for mobile devices. The OS pre-installs and makes the designated undertaking’s own web browser the default on mobile devices that are powered by the OS. Users of mobile phones that use this OS rarely take the time to download alternative web browsers, or to set alternatives as the default. This makes it significantly harder for other web browsers to build market share and compete.
To remedy this, during the course of the investigation the CMA may propose a pro-competition order that prohibits the designated undertaking’s OS from pre-installing a web browser on mobile phone devices. However, the designated undertaking may provide evidence that the pre-installed web browser on the device improves the quality of the product for consumers, as it makes setting up the new phone easier and quicker.
If the CMA accepted the evidence and took the view that it was appropriate to preserve the benefit, it could instead propose to introduce a different pro-competition order to preserve this benefit. It may instead propose to require the designated undertaking’s OS to present users with a choice screen when setting up a device, with different options for setting the default web browser. This could remedy the competition concern by giving users an active choice in their preferred web browser, whilst preserving the consumer benefits of pre-installed web browsers.
	Subsection (3) sets out how the CMA can implement a PCI. It can take the form of either - or both - an order imposing requirements on the designated undertaking, and non-binding recommendations to other persons exercising functions of a public nature on steps they should take. Other parties may include the Government or another independent regulator better placed to act (e.g. by way of statutory powers and expertise). The CMA can also implement a PCI in relation to any part of the designated undertaking’s business, where the CMA decides that such requirements or non-binding recommendations would address the competition problem.
	Example (2): A pro-competition order on an undertaking
The CMA may order a designated undertaking to make its designated social media service interoperable with other competitors’ social media platforms, with features including cross-posting on multiple platforms, in order to allow competitors to overcome barriers to entry and expansion and facilitate greater competition.
Example (3): A recommendation to another party
The CMA may find that there is an adverse effect on competition relating to a designated undertaking’s mobile operating system (OS). The OS restricts competitors’ access to the technology needed to make contactless payments on the mobile devices that are powered by the designated OS. The CMA may recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) intervenes to address some of the concerns, if it judged in the circumstances of the case that the FCA could be better placed to intervene due to its expertise as the conduct regulator for the UK’s financial markets.
	Subsection (4) provides that, while the PCI power primarily empowers the CMA to address an adverse effect on competition, a PCI may additionally make provision to remedy or minimise any related detrimental effects on UK users and UK customers. The CMA may take this detriment into account when deciding which PCI remedy to implement.
	Subsection (5) defines an adverse effect on competition in the United Kingdom and provides that a factor or combination of factors associated with a designated digital activity causes adverse effects on competition where it prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the relevant digital activity in the United Kingdom. These factors can be related to a designated undertaking’s conduct (e.g. self-preferencing behaviour) or factors not caused by the designated undertaking’s conduct (e.g. the designated undertaking benefits from network effects resulting from large numbers of users).
	An adverse effect on competition can concern competition in relation to the relevant digital activity itself; or it may concern competition in relation to another activity, provided the effect is connected to the relevant digital activity.