Part 6: Offences involving violent or abusive behaviour Section 71: Consent to serious harm for sexual gratification not a defence
This Section restates in statute law the general proposition (established in the case of R. v. Brown [1993] 2 W.L.R.556) that a person may not consent to the infliction of serious harm and, by extension, is unable to consent to their own death. It also reflects the exception in relation to consent in cases involving the transmission of sexually transmitted infections, in so far as the law has been established by the cases of R v Dica [2004] 3 All ER 539 and R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706.
	Subsection (1) sets out that the Section applies for the purposes of determining whether a person (‘D’), who inflicts "serious harm" on another person (‘V’) is guilty of a "relevant offence", as defined within subsection (3).
	Subsection (2) provides that, unless subsection (4) applies, it is not a defence that another person consented to the infliction of the serious harm for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification.
	Subsection (3) defines what is meant by "relevant harm" and "serious harm" by reference to sections 18 (causing grievous bodily harm with intent), 20 (inflicting grievous bodily harm) and 47 (actual bodily harm) of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 ("the 1861 Act").
	Subsection (4) provides for an exception to subsection (2) where the serious harm under section 20 or 47 of the 1861 Act consists of, or is a result of, the infection of V with a sexual transmitted infection in the course of sexual activity, and V consented to the sexual activity in the knowledge or belief that D had the sexually transmitted infection. This subsection preserves the position (as set out paragraph 58 of the judgment in R v Dica) that where D intends for V to be infected then consent would provide no defence to a charge under section 18 of the 1861 Act.
	Subsection (5) provides that it does not matter whether the harm was inflicted for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification for D, V or some other person.
	Subsection (6) provides that nothing in this Section affects any enactment or rule of law relating to other circumstances in which a person’s consent to the infliction of serious harm may, or may not, be a defence to a relevant offence.