Part 1: Espionage, sabotage and persons acting for foreign powers Espionage etc Section 2: Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets
Section 2 creates an offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. Subsection (1) provides that a person commits an offence if, without authorisation, they obtain, copy, record, retain, disclose, or provide access to a trade secret. The person must know, or having regard to other matters known to them, ought reasonably to know that their conduct in respect of the trade secret is unauthorised, and the foreign power condition (section 32) must also be met.
	A person’s conduct is unauthorised if they are not entitled to determine whether they may engage in the conduct, and they do not have the consent from a person who is so entitled (subsection (3)). For example, if the trade secret is obtained by unauthorised access to a computer system, or if a person breaches the terms of their employment to retain the information after they have left an organisation.
	For the purposes of this section, a person retains a trade secret if they retain it in their possession or under their control and disclosing a trade secret includes parting with possession (see subsection (9), this mirrors the provision in subsection (5) of section1).
	Subsection (2) defines a "trade secret" and three criteria must be satisfied for it to be classed as such.
It must be information, which is not generally known by, or available to, persons with knowledge of, or expertise in, the field to which it relates, (subsection (2)(a)). A trade secret will not be generally known or accessible to those in circles that normally deal with the information in question.
The information must have actual or potential industrial, economic, or commercial value which would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, adversely affected if the information became generally known by, or available to, such persons (subsection (2)(b)). The value of a trade secret is linked to its secrecy and that value would be diminished were it to become generally known. Potential value could include an idea in the early stages of development without an immediate commercial value.
Finally, the information must be of a kind that could reasonably be expected to be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known by, or available to, such persons (whether or not it is actually subject to such measures) (subsection (2)(c)).
	References to a trade secret include an article from which such information may be derived.
	The offence applies whether the person’s conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere (subsection (4)), however conduct which takes place wholly outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence only if the trade secret is in the possession or under the control of a UK person (subsection (5)).
	Subsection (6) defines a "UK person", which includes an individual who lives in the United Kingdom, and subsection (7) defines "United Kingdom national" (one form of "UK person").
	Subsection (8) sets out the maximum penalty for the offence. On indictment, the maximum penalty is a term of imprisonment not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both). The inclusion of a fine is in recognition that the offence can be committed by bodies corporate and other similar entities (see section 33).
Example (1): where a person is approached by a foreign power
Person A is approached by Person B, who works for a foreign power. At B’s request, A intentionally discloses a trade secret relating to sensitive artificial intelligence technology, known only by a few people in their company, to B. The information is highly sought after by foreign powers and A is not permitted to disclose the information under the terms of their employment. A knows that B is being directed by a foreign power to obtain this company’s trade secrets and, in disclosing the trade secret, intends for this information to benefit the foreign power in question. Both A and B have committed an offence.
Example (2): where a person approaches a foreign power
Person C is a disgruntled former employee of a UK company with expertise in civil nuclear technology known only by three other people. C travels to a country with an intention to benefit the foreign power through disclosing their retained trade secret information, despite it being prohibited by their former employer and the information being subject to protective measures. Person C has committed an offence.
Example (3): where a person provides access to information
Person D discloses access codes to a sensitive plan for a new clean energy technology (a trade secret), to Person E, whom D knows is working for a foreign power. With these codes, E is able to access the plans from overseas, sharing them widely in their organisation. The plans were kept locked, and the access codes were not widely known, as the plans had future commercial value. Both D and E have committed an offence.