Policy background
On 1 July 1968, the United Kingdom signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT"). Under the NPT, the nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosives devices, and not to support the manufacture or acquisition of such weapons or devices by non-nuclear weapon states. Non-nuclear-weapon states undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept international monitoring of their nuclear material by the IAEA pursuant to "full-scope or comprehensive safeguards agreements" entered into with the IAEA.
	The IAEA is the UN-associated body responsible for oversight of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and nuclear safeguards arrangements. A fundamental principle of the global non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards regime is that the oversight of nuclear safeguards is independent of the country, thereby providing reassurance to international partners that materials from civil nuclear programmes are not used otherwise than for civil activities (and therefore not for weapons purposes). As such, the nuclear weapon states have voluntarily accepted international monitoring of their civil nuclear material, with exemptions for defence purposes, through IAEA safeguards.
	On 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom became a member of Euratom and of the European Community (which has since evolved to become today’s European Union). One of Euratom’s functions is to implement a system of safeguards to control the use of nuclear materials within EU member states. Consequently, the United Kingdom’s current safeguards regime and its main international agreements on nuclear safeguards with the IAEA are fundamentally underpinned by the United Kingdom’s membership of Euratom. The United Kingdom’s current arrangements with the IAEA are between the United Kingdom, Euratom and the IAEA. New bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom and the IAEA were signed on 7 June 2018 and are being put into place for when Euratom nuclear safeguards arrangements no longer apply to the United Kingdom.
	The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 received Royal Assent on 16 March 2017.
	On 29 March 2017, the Prime Minister gave notification to the European Commission of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and from Euratom under section 1(1) of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 20171.
	Following this notification, the Government set out its intention to legislate to put in place a domestic nuclear safeguards regime operated by the existing nuclear regulator, the ONR. The ONR currently performs inspections on United Kingdom nuclear facilities for a range of safety and security purposes (and it has a complementary role supporting Euratom’s and the IAEA’s work in respect of nuclear safeguards).
	The new domestic nuclear safeguards regime will replace the current regime operated by Euratom that will cease to have effect in the United Kingdom following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal. The Queen’s Speech on 21 June 2017 included a Nuclear Safeguards Bill. The Government said:
	"The Bill will establish a UK nuclear safeguards regime as we leave the European Union and Euratom. The Bill will give the Office for Nuclear Regulation powers to take on the role and responsibilities required to meet our international safeguards, and nuclear non-proliferation, obligations."
	Once Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom’s main agreements with the IAEA will become ineffective (as they are based on Euratom membership) and will need to be renegotiated to provide for the United Kingdom’s future safeguards obligations. A new domestic nuclear safeguards regime is therefore essential to ensure the United Kingdom is able to meet the future obligations that are to be (or, in some cases, have been) negotiated with the IAEA and other states.
	Members of the public were not formally consulted on the contents of the Nuclear Safeguards Act. This is because the aim of the Act is to create a legal framework to ensure that the United Kingdom is able to continue to meet its international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards obligations. There will, however, be a full consultation on the new domestic safeguards regime when this is set out in draft regulations which will detail the scope of the future regime, including specific reporting requirements.